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mare of a world in which there are only causal laws, but no spontaneity, (*i. e.*, no genuine individuality,) is not less or laxer logic, but more logic and more insistence on absolutely rigid logic. Instead of shutting our eyes to the determinist logic, let us look straight at it, and I shall be surprised if we do not find that we can see through it. There are positions, however, which it would require at least a substantive essay to defend. In the present notice, I would only urge all readers of M. Bergson to make acquaintance with the recent brilliant work of Professor Varisco, "I Massimi Problemi," where they will find a remarkable, and, in my own judgment, successful attempt to show how the conception of spontaneity, or indetermination, so far from being opposed to logic and requiring to be won by a plunge into Charybdis, is absolutely postulated in all our rational thought about nature and life. I could most earnestly wish that the admirable step of including the present volume in the *Philosophical Library* might be followed by the inclusion of a translation of Professor Varisco's work, which is the more necessary as the number of English-speaking students who can avail themselves of the original Italian is unfortunately much fewer than it ought to be.

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A BEGINNER'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: VOL. I. ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. By Herbert Ernest Cushman. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1910. Pp. xxii, 406.

It would be superfluous to criticise seriously the historical content of this text-book; for the book is in no real sense a new piece of work. In 1899 Professor Cushman published a translation of Windelband's "History of Ancient Philosophy." On most subjects the present volume faithfully and uncritically reproduces the exegeses, estimates, and generalizations of the earlier work; and a considerable part of it is merely an abridged paraphrase of Windelband's book. The author makes a general acknowledgment of his indebtedness in the preface: "I am overwhelmingly indebted to every good authority to whom I have had access, but in the main I have followed the inspiring direction of the great Windelband." Yet this hardly prepares one to find that, on page after page, the phrasing as well as the matter

is borrowed from a single source, that the inspiration is literally verbal. Here, for example, is the greater part of Windelband's account of the Cynic ethics, in Professor Cushman's translation of twelve years ago (pp. 143-44) :

Virtue is not only the highest but the only good,—the only certain means of being happy. Over against this spiritual and therefore sure possession . . . the Cynics despised all that men otherwise held dear. Virtue alone is of worth; wickedness alone is to be shunned; all else is indifferent. From this principle they taught the contempt of riches and luxury, of fame and honor, of sense-pleasure and sense-pain. But with this radical consistency, which ever grew sharper with them, they also despised all the joy and beauty of life, all shame and conventionality, family and country. . . . The fundamental purpose of Cynicism . . . is to make man entirely independent. The wise man, to whom virtue, once gained, is a permanent possession, stands in his complete self-sufficiency over against the great mass of fools. His reward is the perfect independence in which he is equal to the undesiring gods. In order to be as independent of external goods as possible, he reduces his needs to those most external [apparently a misprint for "essential"]. The less one needs, the happier one is. The Cynic Wise Man feels himself free from society also; . . . its laws and its conventions do not bind him. The independent lordship of the virtuous Wise Man does not need civilization and casts it aside.

And here is Professor Cushman's own account of the same matter (pp. 95-96) :

Virtue in the eudaemonistic sense is the only end, and this school agreed with Socrates that this end is to be attained by knowledge. That is to say, virtue or knowledge is only a means of attaining happiness, and all other possessions the Cynics affected to despise. Virtue as knowledge is therefore to be sought; ignorance is to be shunned; all else is a matter of indifference. Riches, luxury, fame, honor, sense-pleasure and pain, and later with logical consistency all shame, convention, family and country were objects of contempt. Man must make himself independent by cutting off all the desires which he cannot satisfy or the desires which seem superfluous. He should keep alive only such desires as are necessary to existence. In independence of all outward circumstance, the Cynic conceives himself to be the Wise Man in contrast to whom the mass of men are fools. The Cynic is therefore the equal of the undesiring gods. He has independent lordship and does not need the artificialities of civilization.

Surely a few quotation-marks would not have come amiss here. Some scruple, it is true, has led the author occasionally to substitute synonyms or to alter the order of words, usually to the detriment of the sense. To say, for example, that "virtue is the only certain means of being happy" was to express precisely

the Cynic contention on the point; to say that "virtue is only a means of attaining happiness" is to express much less than their contention. The passage is not typical of the entire book; but there are many others of an equally reminiscent character. Thus, the summary of the Cyrenaic doctrine, pp. 96-97, is similarly paraphrased from Windelband; much of pp. 153-58 (Plato's ethics and politics) is verbally identical with pp. 208-11 of the earlier publication; most of the exposition of Plotinus and of Iamblichus, and all of that of Proclus, are in like manner 'lifted'; and the entire section on patristic theology, from p. 307 to p. 318, is taken over practically *verbatim*, save for a few omissions, from Windelband's pp. 352-65. Here, again, the original suffers damage in transcription, chiefly in consequence of an unintelligent abridgment. Thus Windelband, referring to Origen's ascription of a measure of divine inspiration even to the pagan moralists, writes that, according to that theologian, souls never have had

to act without the help of grace, which was always active in man as a revelation from heaven, and is revealed perfectly in the person of Jesus. One recognizes that a propædæutic value was given by Origen here, after the manner of the Apologists, to the heathen philosophy, especially to Platonism and Stoicism. The eternal *λόγος* has connected itself with the blameless *ψυχή* of Jesus in a divine-human unity.

Professor Cushman converts this into the following, in which much of the sense, and of the connection between the sentences, disappears and a gratuitous anachronism is interpolated by the addition of the prefix "neo-" (*italics mine*):

[Spirits] always have the help of divine grace, which is always active within man and has also been perfectly revealed in Jesus Christ. After the manner of the Apologists, Origen *makes use of the Stoic and neo-Platonic conceptions*, for the eternal Logos takes form in the divine-human unity of Jesus.

As a history, then, the book has no legitimate *raison d'être*; its only excuse for being consists in certain pedagogic novelties in the presentation. It makes use, to a degree unusual in histories of philosophy, of the typographic and other devices common in high-school text-books: display type, tabular views, frequent recapitulations, summaries at the ends of chapters, maps, and 'memory-hooks' of various kinds; and it is written in short,

plain, highly categorical sentences. There is doubtless a certain utility in these accommodations to the intellectual infirmity and immaturity of the American undergraduate. The author also endeavors to render the approach to philosophy more attractive by introducing more geography than usual (which is a rather amusing idea), and by connecting the history of doctrines with political and literary history. The latter part of the program, however, does not come to much more than a thundering in the index. The book displays a certain amount of pedagogical ingenuity; but this does not compensate for the fact that its content, save in a few passages, seems purely a product of mechanical compilation or transcription, which gives small evidence of having really passed through the author's own mind and of having been thoroughly reflected upon and revitalized there. The great pedagogic problem, in relation to the history of philosophy, is to make these ancient doctrines and reasonings seem plausible, inevitable, and alive. In the present text-book that problem still remains far from a solution.

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A COMMENTARY ON HEGEL'S LOGIC. By J. M. E. McTaggart, D.Litt. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. Pp. xv, 311.

This latest book of Dr. McTaggart's supplements his previous works, "Studies in Hegelian Dialectic" and "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology"; for it contains a detailed exposition of the logical framework underlying the views advocated in those books. We here have, expressed with great lucidity and adorned by a style of admirable conciseness, the principal links in a chain of reasoning which, Dr. McTaggart thinks, is capable of proving "that all that exists forms a universe composed of individuals; that the universe and that each individual is an organic system; and that the relation which exists between the universe-system and the individual-systems is one of perfect harmony." And it is a fair deduction, he adds, that each individual is in harmony with all the other individuals. This much, according to Dr. McTaggart, the Hegelian logic (or some amended train of reasoning very similar to that actually elaborated by Hegel) can strictly prove. This statement, indeed, is by no means a full account of Dr. McTaggart's view of reality.